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ARTICLES
Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equality
of Initial Opportunities*
Peter Vallentyne
INTRODUCTION
In the old days, material egalitarians tended to favor equality of outcome
advantage, on some suitable conception of advantage (happiness, re-
sources, etc.). Under the influence of Dworkin’s seminal articles on
equality,1 contemporary material egalitarians have tended to favor equal-
ity of brute luck advantage—on the grounds that this permits people
to be held appropriately accountable for the benefits and burdens of
their choices. I shall argue, however, that a plausible conception of
egalitarian justice requires neither that brute luck advantage always be
equalized nor that people always bear the full cost of their voluntary
choices. Instead, justice requires that initial opportunities for advantage
be equalized—roughly along the lines suggested by Arneson and Co-
hen.2 Brute luck egalitarianism and initial opportunity egalitarianism
are fairly similar in motivation, and as a result they have not been
adequately distinguished. Once the two views are more clearly con-
* I’m grateful for the helpful comments from Dick Arneson, Ian Carter, Paula Casal,
Jerry Cohen, Roger Crisp, Tony Ellis, Ce´cile Fabre, Marc Fleurbaey, Klemens Kappel,
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Andrew Mason, Colin Macleod, David Miller, Mike Otsuka,
Ingmar Persson, Terry Price, Eric Rakowski, Arthur Ripstein, Martin Sandbu, Seana Shif-
frin, Hillel Steiner, Bertil Tungodden, Alex Voorhoeve, Andrew Williams, and an anony-
mous editor of this journal.
1. Ronald Dworkin, “What Is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare” and “What Is
Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 10 (1981): 185–245,
283–345.
2. Richard Arneson, “Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare,” Philosophical Studies
56 (1989): 77–93, and “Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for
Welfare,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 19 (1990): 158–94; G. A. Cohen, “On the Currency
of Egalitarian Justice,” Ethics 99 (1989): 906–44.
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trasted, equality of opportunity for advantage will, I claim, be seen to
be a more plausible conception of equality.
BACKGROUND
The concept of justice is construed in several different ways: as rightness
of institutions, as rightness of distributions, as coercively enforceable
duties, as what we owe others (as opposed to what we owe ourselves or
owe impersonally), and as fairness (i.e., what we owe others in purely
comparative terms). Here I am concerned with justice in the sense of
what we owe others. So understood, justice is not concerned exclusively
with the comparative issue of ensuring that individuals with equal claims
get equal benefits (fairness). It is also concerned with ensuring that the
claims of individuals are fully met (noncomparative justice).
A plausible conception of justice requires, I shall assume, some sort
of promotion of equality of material advantage (perhaps constrained
by certain rights). Obviously, this assumption is highly controversial.
Some (e.g., traditional libertarians) would reject the relevance of con-
sequences generally and consequences for the disadvantaged in partic-
ular. Others would defend a sufficiency view, according to which justice
requires that everyone have a sufficient level of benefits but does not
further require equality.3 Others would defend a prioritarian view, ac-
cording to which justice requires promoting benefits but with extra
weight given to those who are worse off.4 Still others would defend some
kind of equality of social status quite independently of the effects on
material advantage.5 My goal here, however, is not to defend the rele-
vance of material equality but, rather, to defend a particular conception
of material equality as the most plausible for the theory of justice.
There has been a great debate about the appropriate equalisandum
for material equality (and more generally about the appropriate object
3. See, e.g., Harry Frankfurt, “Equality as a Moral Idea,” Ethics 98 (1987): 21–43.
4. See, e.g., Derek Parfit, “Equality or Priority,” Lindley Lecture (University of Kansas,
Department of Philosophy, 1991); Dennis McKerlie, “Egalitarianism,” Dialogue 23 (1984):
223–38, and “Equality or Priority,” Utilitas 6 (1994): 25–42. Arneson tentatively endorses
prioritarianism over (his formerly endorsed) initial opportunity egalitarianism in his
“Equality,” in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, ed. Robert E. Goodin and
Philip Pettit (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 489–507, and in his “Equality of Opportunity
for Welfare Defended and Recanted,” Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (1999): 488–97. Ar-
neson’s endorsement of (desert-weighted) prioritarianism is explicit in his “Luck Egali-
tarianism and Prioritarianism,” Ethics 110 (2000): 339–49.
5. For example, David Miller, “What Kind of Equality Should the Left Pursue?” in
Equality, ed. Jane Franklin (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1997), pp. 83–99;
Elizabeth Anderson, “What Is the Point of Equality?” Ethics 109 (1999): 287–337; Jonathan
Wolff, “Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 27 (1998):
97–122; and Andrew Mason, “Equality, Personal Responsibility, and Gender Socialisation,”
Proceedings of Aristotelian Society 100 (1999–2000): 227–46.
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of concern for justice). Some (e.g., Dworkin, Rakowski, Steiner, and Van
Parijs) ground the equalisandum primarily in the competitive value of
resources.6 Others (e.g., Arneson and to some extent Cohen) ground
it in well-being.7 Others (e.g., Sen and to some extent Cohen) ground
it in functionings.8 I shall here leave this issue open and simply appeal
to advantage, where this is whatever aspect of outcomes ultimately mat-
ters for individuals.
There is, however, a second dimension to this debate. For, no matter
what conception of outcome advantage one adopts, there is still the
further question of whether it is equality of outcome advantage, equality
of opportunity for advantage, equality of brute luck advantage, or some-
thing else that is the equalisandum. This article focuses on this second
issue.
BRUTE LUCK VERSUS OPTION LUCK
In the next section, I shall argue in favor of equality of initial oppor-
tunities for advantage and against equality of brute luck advantage. First,
however, I shall examine, in this section, the distinction between brute
luck and option luck. For this distinction can be, and has been, drawn
in several different ways. It will therefore be useful to start by trying to
sort out some of these issues. Throughout, option luck is understood
as the complement of brute luck.
Brute luck egalitarianism requires that brute luck advantage be
equalized. But what is brute luck? Authors (including myself!) some-
times write as if brute luck is to be understood in the following terms:
Brute Luck as Not Foreseeably Chosen: The occurrence of an event is
due to brute luck for an agent if and only if the possibility of its
occurrence was not (for the agent) a (reasonably) foreseeable
outcome of his or her choices.
This understanding of the distinction between brute and option
luck, however, is inadequate. To see the problem, compare two cases in
each of which there are just two identically situated identical agents. In
the first case, the agents have no choices and are simply exposed to the
6. Dworkin, “What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources”; Eric Rakowski, Equal
Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Hillel Steiner, An Essay on Rights (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1994); Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1995).
7. Arneson, “Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare” and “Liberalism, Distrib-
utive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare”; Cohen.
8. Amartya Sen, “Equality of What?” in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, ed. Sterling
McMurrin (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1980), vol. 1, pp. 353–69, and Inequality
Reexamined (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).
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same natural lottery—exposure to lightning strikes, say. The outcomes
of the lottery are clearly due to brute luck, since no choice is involved
at all. In the second situation, each agent has two choices—to stop or
to continue traveling during a storm—but their choices have no effect
on the probabilities of being struck by lightning. Whatever choice they
make, they are exposed to the same natural lottery as in the first situ-
ation. Each agent is fully aware of the outcomes of each choice (and
in particular that the probability of being struck by lightning is not
affected by what choice he or she makes). Each agent chooses (arbi-
trarily) to stop, and then one is struck by lightning, and the other is
not. Given that the possibility and probability of being struck by light-
ning, given their choices, were reasonably foreseeable by the agents, the
above view of brute luck would classify this as nonbrute luck (option
luck). There seems, however, to be no reason to treat this case differently
from the initial case. Both involve unavoidable inequalities in outcome
luck. There was nothing the agents could have done to alter their ex-
posure to the lightning strikes. Hence, the presence of fully informed
choice—even along with background equality—is not sufficient to make
an outcome a matter of option luck.9
A better (normatively more relevant) understanding of brute luck
is in terms of avoidability:
Brute Luck as (Reasonable) Unavoidability: The occurrence of an
event is due to brute luck for an agent if and only if the agent
could not have (reasonably) avoided the possibility of its occur-
rence.
The notion of avoidability (like that of foreseeability) is to be un-
derstood as lifetime avoidability. That is, the issue is whether the agent
could have—at some point in his or her life—avoided the possibility of
the result. The mere fact that a result is unavoidable for the agent shortly
before its occurrence does not make the result a matter of brute luck.
For the situation in which the result is unavoidable (e.g., that the loan
shark will break my legs) may itself have been avoidable (e.g., by my
not borrowing money from her at an earlier time). For simplicity, my
9. An important issue that I shall not address is the following: with respect to avoid-
ability (and, below, influenceability), is it the specific events that matter or the impact on
advantage? For example, suppose that no matter what I do I will be struck by lightning
and suffer a disadvantage of 10. If I make one choice I will be struck and lose the use of
my left arm (disadvantage of 10, say). If I make a different choice, I will be struck by a
different lightning bolt and lose some of the function of my right arm (disadvantage 10
as well). My disadvantage of 10 is not avoidable, but some of the particular events and
outcomes are. I’m inclined to think that, for the characterization of brute luck, it is the
impact on advantage that matters, but I shall not attempt to resolve this issue. The examples
and discussion below can be recast if necessary.
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examples and related discussion will assume that what is unavoidable
in a situation was not earlier avoidable.
This conception of brute luck rightly sees no difference between
the lightning strikes of the first situation and those of the second sit-
uation above (since in both cases there is nothing that the agent could
do to eliminate the possibility of the strikes). Most authors (e.g., Ar-
neson, Cohen, Rakowski, and Roemer) employ at least something like
this conception.10 Indeed, it is present in Dworkin’s original definition:
Option luck is a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles
turn out—whether someone gains or loses through accepting an
isolated risk he or she should have anticipated and might have
declined. Brute luck is a matter of how risks fall out that are not
in that sense deliberate gambles.11
There is, however, a question concerning how avoidability is to be
understood. On a strict construal, if an agent can avoid exposure to the
risk of being struck by lightning by always lying on the ground, then
lightning strike outcomes are not due to brute luck. A problem with
this view is that it does not take into account the reasonability of avoiding
the result in question. Lying on the ground may sometimes be reason-
able, but it is certainly unreasonable in many contexts. Where lying on
the ground is unreasonable, the fact that by doing so one can avoid
lightning strikes seems irrelevant.
On a looser construal, brute luck is taken to include all and only
outcomes that are not reasonably avoidable by the agent. If, for example,
lying on the ground was reasonable (e.g., because of warnings about
stormy conditions), then failure to do so will make the results a matter
of option luck. If it was not (e.g., because weather conditions were
expected to be nonstormy), then failure to do so will not automatically
make the results a matter of option luck.
Of course, this raises the question of what counts as reasonable
avoidability. An outcome is reasonably avoidable just in case there is,
for the agent, some reasonable choice that avoids the outcome. But
what makes a choice reasonable? One view is that it is in the agent’s
best interest. Another view is that it is adequately (either in absolute
terms or relative to the best choice) in the agent’s interests. Of course,
10. These authors each emphasize something like the ability to control the occurrence
of the event. See Arneson, “Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare” and “Liberalism,
Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare”; Cohen; Rakowski, pp.
73–74; and John Roemer, “A Pragmatic Theory of Responsibility for the Egalitarian Plan-
ner,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 22 (1993): 146–66, and Equality of Opportunity (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), chap. 3.
11. Dworkin, “What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources,” p. 293; emphasis added.
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there are other possibilities as well. I shall not attempt to resolve the
issue of how reasonability should be understood in this context. Instead,
I shall note a general problem with appealing to reasonability.
No matter how exactly reasonableness is understood, appealing to
reasonable avoidability faces, it seems, a structural problem. Suppose
that an agent has two choices and that the outcomes are completely
determined by the choices (no risk is involved). (The same point can
be made when outcomes are only probabilistically determined by
choices.) The agent may choose to pursue an education and live a
wonderful life, or she may choose to become a drug addict and live a
terrible life. The first option, let us stipulate, is a reasonable choice,
whereas the second is not. Hence, the wonderful life is not reasonably
avoidable (because it’s the only reasonable option), whereas the terrible
life is. Thus, if brute luck is understood as not reasonably avoidable,
then the wonderful life outcome is brute luck, and the terrible life
outcome is viewed as option luck. It seems intuitively strange, however,
to think that the wonderful life outcome is a matter of brute luck. The
agent had a fully free choice (we can stipulate), and if she chose the
wonderful life, it would seem that the outcome is a matter of option
luck.12 More generally, where two identically situated agents make dif-
ferent choices, the differential impact of their choices is, it seems, option
luck. Furthermore, it seems strange that the classification of wonderful
life outcome would change (from brute luck to option luck) if an option
were added that produced an equally wonderful, although different,
life. In this case, the original wonderful life outcome would be reason-
ably avoidable (and hence deemed option luck), since the added option
is also a reasonable choice.
Perhaps these implications are not as troubling as they first seem.
Alternatively, perhaps there is some other way of capturing the notion
of reasonable avoidability.13 I shall not pursue the matter further here,
since ultimately I will argue against the normative significance of the
distinction between brute and option luck.
12. Note that here, as is standard in the literature, option luck is understood as the
complement of brute luck. Hence, even though no luck is involved in the examples (since
choices determine the outcomes), certain outcomes (e.g., the terrible life) are classified
as option luck. The point of the example, however, could also be made if choice did not
determine outcomes and luck was involved.
13. Martin E. Sandbu has insightfully argued that brute luck is luck that is present
in the least risky reasonable prospect. See his “On Dworkin’s Brute Luck–Option Luck
Distinction and the Consistency of Brute Luck Egalitarianism,” working paper (Harvard
University, 2001), available from the author upon request. For insightful discussions of
reasonability conditions, see Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, “Egalitarianism, Option Luck, and
Responsibility,” Ethics 111 (2001): 548–79; and Michael Otsuka, “Luck, Insurance, and
Equality,” Ethics (in press).
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The characterization of brute luck as (reasonable) unavoidability
has some further problems. One is that at best it is a gross simplification
of a more adequate general idea of inability to influence. Inability to
avoid is one way that an agent can be unable to influence outcomes,
but it is not the only way. Suppose that an agent has a choice between
a 99 percent chance of 100 and a 1 percent chance of zero, on the one
hand, and a 1 percent chance of 100 and a 99 percent chance of zero,
on the other. The agent is unable to avoid the possibility of each of the
two outcomes, but she is able to influence the chance of their realization.
The above characterization ignores how agents can influence outcomes
by influencing their probabilities. A more general characterization is
the following:
Brute Luck as (Reasonable) Inability to Influence : The occurrence of
an event is due to brute luck for an agent if and only if the agent
could not have (reasonably) influenced the possibility or proba-
bility of its occurrence.
This is a more adequate characterization of brute luck, since it
recognizes that avoidability is but one way that outcomes may be influ-
enceable by an agent. There is, however, a further problem. The “if and
only if” clause in this characterization is problematic, for it requires that
an outcome be classified as nonbrute luck as long as the agent could
have even some very minimal influence on the outcome. For example,
if an agent has a choice between a 50 percent chance of 100 and a 50
percent chance of zero, on the one hand, and a 50.00001 percent chance
of 100 and a 49.99999 percent chance of zero, on the other, then the
above condition holds that the result is entirely due to option luck (since
she has some, extremely minimal, influence over probabilities). If, how-
ever, the two choices had identical payoffs and probabilities, then the
result would be classified as brute luck (since she would have no influ-
ence over the outcome). It seems rather strange that a minute difference
in probabilities should convert the entire outcome from brute luck to
option luck.14 A more adequate characterization would replace “if and
only if” with “to the extent that” and then have some method of ap-
portioning outcomes between brute luck and option luck based on the
degree of influence the agent had. It is not, however, clear that any
14. A similar problem arises where one can minimally influence the nature and
advantage value of the outcomes (as opposed to probabilities). The “if and only if” clause
requires that, where there is no influence, the outcomes be classified as due to brute luck,
but, where there is even a small influence, the outcomes be classified as due to option
luck.
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plausible method of apportionment exists. Hence, this is an open ques-
tion for brute luck egalitarians to address.15
There is yet one more complication related to the reasonableness
of choice that we need to consider. So far, we have been discussing issues
that arise even when agents are fully informed. The new issue concerns
how incomplete or false beliefs should be reflected in the characteri-
zation of brute luck. Often agents are unable to influence events, the
possibility of which they cannot foresee, but this is not always so. Some
events may be unforeseeable but nonetheless influenceable. For ex-
ample, an agent in the late 1970s may not have been able to foresee
the possibility of catching AIDS from unprotected sex, but he could
nonetheless have influenced the probability thereof by abstaining from
unprotected sex. Influenceability (as well as avoidability) is, at least as
I have been understanding it, objectively determined, whereas reason-
able foreseeability is partly subjectively determined. Hence, they are
distinct issues.
For simplicity, we shall focus on the initial beliefs of agents so as
to be sure that the false or incomplete beliefs are clearly a matter of
brute luck. Agents are owed compensation for such doxastic defects if
others do not suffer from them. That, however, is not the issue here.
The issue concerns whether the outcomes of choices of two identical
agents with the same imperfect beliefs in identical situations can be due
to differential brute luck even if the agents can influence the outcomes.
Suppose two identical agents face the same choice situation. The
first choice yields 100, and the second choice yields zero, but, because
of their unavoidably imperfect (and identical) beliefs, they each rea-
sonably view their choices as between 60 and 60. Suppose that Smith
(arbitrarily) makes the first choice and ends up with 100, and Jones
(arbitrarily) makes the second choice and ends up with zero. Because
Jones’s result was avoidable (and, indeed, reasonably avoidable based
on the objective payoffs), this result is classified as option luck. It seems
strange, however, for brute luck egalitarianism to hold that the resulting
inequality is just. Although the zero result was as matter of fact avoidable,
Jones could not have reasonably foreseen the results of her choice. It
seems strange to hold Jones accountable for results that she could not
have reasonably foreseen. It also seems strange to hold that Smith is
somehow entitled (because of it being option luck) to the 100-unit
advantage, when she only foresaw the possibility of a 60-unit advantage.
Although I argued above that the mere fact that the possibility of
an event was a foreseeable result of the agent’s choices is not a sufficient
15. Skepticism about a categorical distinction between brute luck and option luck
has been independently raised by Marc Fleurbaey in “Egalitarian Opportunities,” Law and
Philosophy 20 (2001): 499–530.
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condition for the outcome to be option luck, the above example suggests
that it may nonetheless be a necessary condition. This suggests the
following characterization of brute luck, where an agent deliberately
influences an outcome just in case he or she influences its occurrence
and is aware that she has this influence:
Brute Luck as Not (Reasonably) Deliberately Influenceable : The occur-
rence (or nonoccurrence) of an event is due to brute luck for an
agent to the extent that the agent could not have (reasonably)
deliberately influenced the possibility or probability of its occur-
rence (nonoccurrence).16
In the above example—in which the first choice yields 100 and the
second choice yields zero, but each of the identical and identically sit-
uated agents reasonably believes that each choice yields 60—this char-
acterization has the following implications. The agent that chose the
first option reaped 40 units in excess of his reasonable expectations
(100 vs. 60). The agent that chose the second option reaped a 60-unit
shortfall from her reasonable expectations (zero vs. 60). The excess and
the shortfall are deemed brute luck (since they were not deliberately
influenceable) and equalized. This requires a 50-unit transfer from the
first agent to the second (20 units to share the good brute luck of the
first agent and another 30 units to share in the bad brute luck of the
second agent). Each thus ends up with 50 units.
This completes my examination of the characterization of brute luck.
Unavoidability is at the core of the characterization of brute luck, but it
seems plausible also to include (1) events for which the agent has no
ability to influence the probability and (2) events for which the agent is
unaware of his or her ability to influence the probability (because of false
or incomplete beliefs). It also seems plausible to take brute luck to include
events that are not reasonably subject to deliberate influence (even if
strictly speaking they are so influenceable), but it’s not clear how this can
be done. The main problem for brute luck egalitarianism, however, is
16. Dworkin’s original definition of option luck includes a deliberateness requirement:
“an isolated risk he or she should have anticipated and might have declined” (“What Is
Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources,” p. 293). Rakowski is one of the few commentators
who, when reformulating Dworkin’s distinction, explicitly recognizes both uninfluence-
ability (or at least avoidability) and unforeseeability as individually sufficient conditions
for brute luck: “The distinction is therefore between, on the one hand, risks that people
must ineluctably bear or that, though they could in principle have avoided running, they
had no reason beforehand to associate with an activity in which they engaged, and, on
the other hand, all other risks that people knowingly run or of which they should be
aware” (pp. 73–74). The issue of foreseeability is also discussed insightfully by Lippert-
Rasmussen, “Egalitarianism, Option Luck, and Responsibility”; by Otsuka; and by Thomas
Christiano, “Comments on Elizabeth Anderson’s ‘What Is the Point of Equality?’” available
on-line at http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/9904chri.html, 1999.
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that any relevant distinction between brute luck and option luck will be
a matter of degree. Small differences in deliberate influenceability should
not convert the entire outcome from brute luck to option luck, or vice
versa. Brute luck egalitarianism thus needs some measure of the degree
of brute luck. It’s not at all clear, however, how this might be done.
Furthermore, it’s not clear how brute luck egalitarianism should be un-
derstood if brute luck is a matter of degree. This problem is thus a
fundamental problem confronting brute luck egalitarianism.
Below I shall develop a second, and more fundamental, attack on
brute luck egalitarianism. I shall argue that, even if there is a plausible
measure of the degree of brute luck, it is not relevant for justice. Instead,
justice requires that initial opportunities for advantage be equalized.
Before arguing for this claim, I shall first clarify the notion of initial
opportunities and contrast it with brute luck equality.
INITIAL OPPORTUNITIES
However exactly brute luck is understood, it will include luck in initial
opportunities for advantage (e.g., one’s initial genetic endowment and
one’s initial social position) and some kinds of outcome luck (i.e., some
kinds of luck in how things turn out; e.g., whether an uninfluenceable
contingent possibility of a lighting strike is realized). Not included in
brute luck are outcomes that are suitably related to choice—option luck.
This includes both outcomes that are directly chosen in some appro-
priate sense (e.g., avoidable foreseen and certain outcomes of one’s
choices; e.g., being wet when one chooses not to open one’s umbrella
in the rain) and those that are risky outcomes that are suitably related
to one’s choices (e.g., winning or losing a lottery for which one pur-
chased a ticket)—option outcome luck. Option luck, the complement
of brute luck, thus (somewhat misleadingly) includes the direct results
of choices when no luck is involved as well as option outcome luck.
Thus, we have four factors that jointly determine what outcomes
are realized: brute luck in initial opportunities, brute outcome luck,
choices, option outcome luck. To make the role of these four factors
maximally clear, it may be helpful to have a diagrammatic display. The
brute luck initial opportunities can be represented by a horizontal de-
cision tree in which each branch represents an empirically possible way
one’s life can go. Along the decision tree, there are branches at various
nodes. At some nodes—chance nodes—the path taken is determined
by “acts of nature” or by the choices of others. At other nodes—choice
nodes—the path taken is determined by the choice of the agent in
question. Thus, initial opportunities are represented by a full decision
tree, choices by choice nodes, outcome luck (which may be brute or
option) by what happens at chance nodes, and outcomes by full
branches (or paths). Writing the probabilities under the chance node
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Fig. 1
columns, and the advantage value of each full branch under the out-
come column, figure 1 below provides an example. This represents the
initial opportunities of a perfectly informed agent, where there is a 20
percent chance of a brute luck event occurring that results in no further
choices or chance events and has a value of zero. If this brute luck event
does not occur, then the agent confronts the choice between c1 and
c2, both of which I’ll assume are reasonable (their expected values are
5 and 4.8, respectively). If she chooses c1, then there are no further
choices or chance events, and the outcome has a value of 5. If she
chooses c2, then she is exposed to some option luck. She has a 10
percent chance of having a path worth 30 and a 90 percent chance of
a path worth 2. (For simplicity, in this diagram brute outcome luck is
shown as occurring prior to choice, but it may also occur after choices
are made.)
Equality of initial opportunities for advantage calls for equality in
the value of the initial decision trees that each agent confronts. Equality
of brute luck calls for equality in the net result of the initial decision
trees (initial brute luck) and (later) brute outcome luck events. These
two views are each superior to two other egalitarian views. Equality of
outcome advantage is problematic because it is not sensitive to the value
people assign to having the freedom to engage in certain kinds of risky
behavior (e.g., buying lottery tickets) and because it is highly insensitive
to the administrative and incentive costs of outcome equalization (totally
insensitive except where there is more than one way of equalizing out-
come advantage). Some would also claim (although I shall argue against
this view below) that it fails to hold people suitably accountable for their
choices. Equality of luck holds that all factors except direct choice call
for equalization. It calls for compensating for all kinds of luck (both
brute and option luck) but allows uncompensated differences in out-
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comes when they are due solely to differences in choices (e.g., when it
is raining and no luck is involved, I knowingly choose to get wet by not
using my umbrella and you knowingly choose not to be wet by using
your umbrella). Although a slight improvement on equality of outcome,
it still suffers from most of the main problems just mentioned. In par-
ticular, it implausibly always calls for the elimination of the effects of
option outcome luck in chosen lotteries (e.g., regular lotteries).17
Equality of brute luck and equality of initial opportunities each
hold that inequalities in initial opportunities are to be compensated.
Brute luck equality also requires that inequalities in brute outcome luck
be compensated. In the next section, I will argue against this second
requirement.18 First, however, I’ll briefly clarify two aspects of initial
opportunity egalitarianism.
What point in a person’s life counts as the “initial” point for the
purposes of evaluating opportunities? There are two main candidates
here—at the onset of (perhaps partial) moral standing and at the onset
of some kind of full moral standing. If, for example, individuals acquire
moral standing when they become sentient, but do not acquire a full
set of moral rights until they are rational agents, then opportunities
would be evaluated either at the onset of sentience or at the onset of
agency. Arneson has tended to favor something like the full moral stand-
ing view (onset of adulthood), but this view is, I believe, implausible.
For, if full moral standing is understood in absolute terms (e.g., as
requiring rational agency), then sentient individuals not capable of ra-
tional agency (e.g., sufficiently mentally impaired individuals) will be
left out of the equation. For the present purposes, however, we can leave
this issue open.
How exactly are initial opportunities to be evaluated? Admittedly,
17. Equality of luck is at least roughly identical to what Arneson calls (misleadingly
in my view, since it focuses on outcomes) “strict equality of opportunity.” See his “Postscript
(1995) to ‘Equality and Equality of Opportunity for Welfare,’” in Equality: Selected Readings,
ed. Louis Pojman and Robert Westmoreland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.
238–42, and “Equality of Opportunity for Welfare Defended and Recanted.” Equality of
luck is not the view that Anderson calls “luck egalitarianism” in “What Is the Point of
Equality?” This latter view is simply brute luck egalitarianism. It is misleading to call it
“luck egalitarianism,” since it does not call for equalizing option luck.
18. The fact that equality of initial opportunity does not guarantee equality of brute
luck precisely because it does not guarantee equality of brute outcome luck was not initially
adequately recognized. The divergence has also been noted—in the form of an objection
to equality of initial opportunity—by Marc Fleurbaey, “Equal Opportunity for Equal Social
Outcome,” Economics and Philosophy 11 (1995): 25–55; and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen,
“Arneson on Equality of Opportunity for Welfare,” Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (1999):
478–87. In his reply to the latter, Arneson acknowledges the divergence and (mistakenly,
in my view) seeks to modify the equality of initial opportunity view so as to equalize for
brute outcome luck. See his “Equality of Opportunity for Welfare Defended and Recanted.”
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this is a tricky issue, and there will probably be more than one plausible
way of doing this, but there is no problem in principle. Here I shall
identify some plausible approaches.
The first point to note is that we are concerned with effective op-
portunity for advantage. Hence, we must factor in not only the external
opportunities but also the personal capacities and resources of the agent.
As Arneson has emphasized,19 agents vary in their initial decision-making
and decision-implementing abilities, and the evaluation of opportunity
sets must adequately reflect this. A simpleminded idea would be to
evaluate the opportunities on the assumption that an agent always
chooses the best option of which he or she is capable. This will be an
agent-relative matter, since the best feasible choice for one agent may
not be feasible for another agent (e.g., due to a disability). This, however,
is still not sufficiently sensitive to the agent’s decision-making and im-
plementing abilities. For some agents may be more prone to mistakes
and weakness of the will, and this is not reflected if opportunity sets
are evaluated on the basis of best choices. The best options available to
each of two identical fallible agents may be equally good, but their
second-best option might have radically different values. Given their
fallibility, the difference in the second-best options matters.
Arneson proposes that two opportunity sets be judged equally val-
uable just in case (1) the best life path in the first opportunity set is
equally valuable with the best life path in the second, (2) the second-
best life path in the first opportunity set is equally valuable with the
second-best life path in the second, and so on. This approach is plausible
as a sufficient condition for opportunity sets being equally valuable. It
fails, however, as a necessary condition. The best life path of one might
be slightly worse than that of the second set, but, given that agents do
not always choose their best option, this might be exactly offset by the
second-best life path being better to an appropriate extent.20
A more general and adequate approach will appeal to an agent’s
choice disposition, which, for each choice situation, specifies for each
feasible option the probability of the agent choosing that option. For
example, suppose that in a given choice situation there are just two
options: D (having dessert), which will make the agent sick because she
has already eaten too much, and ∼D (not having dessert), which is better
for the agent. If the agent is perfectly rational, perfectly informed, not
19. Arneson, “Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare” and “Liberalism, Distrib-
utive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare.”
20. It’s possible, however, that Arneson is not giving a criterion of when opportunity
sets are equally valuable but, rather, of when they are equal in the sense of having iso-
morphic payoff structures. This latter notion is stronger, and there is little reason, I believe,
to require equality in this sense.
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prone to mistakes, and so on, then the choice disposition will assign
zero probability to the choice of D and 100 percent to the choice of
∼D. If the agent is somewhat disposed to suffer from weakness of the
will, and so on, then her choice disposition might assign a 90 percent
probability to the choice of ∼D and a 10 percent probability to the
choice D.21
Initial opportunity sets can thus be evaluated on the basis of their
expected value. Probabilities are used for acts of nature, choices by
others, as well as choices by the agent in question. Suppose, for example,
that an agent faces an opportunity set with a 20 percent brute luck
chance of ending with 100 (with no choices involved) and an 80 percent
chance of having a choice. Suppose further that, if she has a choice,
then she has a 90 percent disposition to make the first choice, which
ends with 200, and a 10 percent disposition to make the second choice,
which ends with zero. In this case, the expected value of the opportunity
set is 164 . This effective op-(p .2# 100 .8# [.9# 200 .1# 0])
portunity set is more valuable than the opportunity set of a second agent
who faces the same external opportunities but has a 20 percent (vs. 10
percent) choice disposition to make the second (less desirable) choice.
The effective opportunity set of this second agent is, on the proposed
method of evaluation, worth 148 (p .2# 100 .8# [.8# 200 .2#
. (In this artificial example, there is no issue of the earlier choices0])
of agents later affecting their choice dispositions, but obviously the idea
applies equally well when later choice dispositions can be influenced.)
One might question, of course, the theoretical legitimacy of as-
cribing probabilities to the choices of autonomous agents. This is indeed
a deep and troubling issue, and all I can do is make a few hand-waving
gestures. First, this approach need not invoke unique probability de-
scriptions. It might instead invoke families of probabilities to reflect the
choice-making dispositions of agents. At the limit, it might even reject
the appeal to probabilities and simply appeal to the possible choices of
an agent. Of course, the move to families of probability functions or to
“possibility” functions will require some way of evaluating opportunity
sets based on such functions, but well-developed approaches already
21. The idea of appealing to probabilistic choice dispositions is borrowed—with mod-
ification— from Roemer, “A Pragmatic Theory of Responsibility for the Egalitarian Plan-
ner” and Equality of Opportunity. He there appeals to the frequency distribution of how
agents of the “same type” (having the same personal factors for which the agent is not
responsible). I replace the frequency distribution with a choice disposition (which un-
derlies the frequency distribution), since frequency distributions can fail to reflect to the
underlying choice dispositions (especially when small numbers are involved). Roemer
does not, however, evaluate opportunity sets on the basis of their expected value given
the probability distribution. Instead, he invokes the frequency distributions of choices to
impose a desert-based constraint on distribution of advantage.
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exist for dealing with “vague probabilities,” “probability interval ascrip-
tions,” and decision making under uncertainty (e.g., the maximin rule).
Thus, such appeals need not create evaluation problems. More gener-
ally, however exactly it is done, it seems clear that there must be some
way of ascribing dispositions to autonomous agents and having those
dispositions affect the value of the effective opportunity sets.
There is, however, a problem with evaluating opportunity sets on
the basis of expected value: it fails to allow for the possibility of rational
risk aversion in this kind of life-encompassing situation. I used expected
value merely as a way of illustrating how the idea could work. The more
general idea leaves open (to be specified by the theory of personal
advantage) how probabilities and possibilities are to be dealt with. The
exact evaluation may build in some mild risk aversion, or even the radical
risk aversion of maximin (maximize the value of the worst possible
outcome). I leave all this open.
There is, however, a further generalization of the idea that is
needed. For the above method of evaluation implicitly assumes that
freedom (availability of choices) is only instrumentally valuable. This
method holds that the values of outcomes determine—in conjunction
with a risk and uncertainty rule—the value of opportunity sets. A more
general approach, therefore, would not assume that the value of op-
portunity sets is reducible in this simple way to the value of outcomes.
I take this to be a question that is to be answered by the theory of
prudential advantage, which may allow that certain kinds of opportu-
nities are intrinsically valuable.
In sum, although there are many different ways that the advantage
value of opportunity sets can be assessed, and each way involves complex
and difficult issues, there is no reason to suppose that a plausible theory
of advantage cannot be developed so that opportunity sets can be eval-
uated. With the above understandings of brute luck and of initial op-
portunities, we are finally ready to ask which should be equalized.
JUSTICE DOES NOT REQUIRE THE EQUALIZATION OF BRUTE
OUTCOME LUCK ADVANTAGE
Initial equality of opportunity for advantage is compatible with equality
of brute luck advantage, but it does not require it. A scheme that pro-
vides equality of initial opportunities for advantage, but with no com-
pensation for brute outcome luck (i.e., brute luck after the initial point),
is one way of ensuring equality of initial opportunities, but it is not the
only way. A second way is to provide (in addition) compensation for
brute outcome luck. In both cases, initial opportunities for advantage
are equal. I shall argue that justice requires compensation for brute
outcome luck when and only when doing so is a way of increasing the
value of people’s initial opportunities.
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Consider two schemes, each of which provides equality of initial
opportunity for advantage, but only one of which provides compensation
for brute outcome luck (e.g., acts of nature that are not deliberately
influenceable). The scheme that provides compensation for brute out-
come luck may have significantly higher administrative costs (since it
needs to gather information about what happens, determine whether
it is brute or option luck, and then collect and make payments). In
addition, it may even have certain adverse incentive effects on people’s
behavior (e.g., it might for contingent reasons make people more prone
to take various unreasonable risks). The net result of the administrative
costs, incentives effects, and all other relevant factors may be that the
initial opportunities for advantage faced by each person are less valuable
under the brute outcome luck compensation scheme than without it.
If that is so, then justice, I claim, forbids equalizing for brute outcome
luck. For example, suppose (for simplicity) that no choices are involved,
and that each person faces a 90 percent brute luck chance of 100 units
and a 10 percent chance of zero units (expected value of 90). The only
alternative is to provide compensation for the brute outcome luck, but,
given very high administrative costs, and so on, this means that we
provide only 10 units of advantage for each person (with brute outcome
luck eliminated). It is implausible to hold that justice requires that brute
outcome luck be equalized in this case. It would radically reduce the
value (from 90 to 10) of everyone’s initial opportunities.
The point is not that justice never permits compensation for brute
outcome luck. It is rather that justice does not always require such
compensation. Initial opportunity egalitarianism favors such equaliza-
tion just to the extent that it efficiently promotes equality of initial
opportunities (e.g., same degree of equality but with more valuable
opportunity sets for all). To the extent that administrative costs are low,
incentive effects are nonnegative, and the value of opportunity sets
reflects some risk aversion, equality of initial opportunity for advantage
will tend to favor compensating for bad brute outcome luck. The exact
level of compensation provided for various kinds of brute luck, however,
will vary depending on the costs and benefits of doing so. It deems it
unjust, however, to provide compensation for brute luck where, for
example, everyone would have equal and better life prospects without
such compensation.
The superiority of initial opportunity egalitarianism to brute luck
egalitarianism as a theory of justice follows from three claims—recalling
that our topic is justice in the sense of giving people their due (as opposed
to the merely comparative concern of fairness). The first claim is uncon-
troversial and holds that if we can give everyone more of what we owe
them (noncomparatively) without upsetting the comparative balance
(e.g., preserving equality among those who have an equal claim), then it
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is unjust not do so. The second claim is that with respect to brute luck
advantage of the relevant sort (to be specified below) individuals have a
(noncomparative) claim to as much as possible compatible with whatever
others get. This is a nonwaste condition. In conjunction with the first
claim, it holds that it is unjust to give everyone one unit of the relevant
brute luck advantage when everyone could be given two units. Any plau-
sible egalitarian theory of justice will satisfy this condition. The third claim
is that the relevant kind of brute luck advantage is initial opportunity for
advantage (initial life prospects)—as opposed to all brute luck advantage
(including brute outcome luck advantage). This, of course, is the con-
troversial claim, and I will now defend it.
Both initial opportunity egalitarianism and brute luck egalitarian-
ism are concerned with brute luck advantage. They take, however, two
different perspectives on the matter. Initial opportunity egalitarianism
takes an ex ante perspective (focusing on probabilities of brute luck
advantage) and brute luck egalitarianism takes an ex post perspective
(focusing on how brute luck advantage turns out). The latter perspective
is highly insensitive to the costs (in terms of brute luck advantage) of
achieving ex post equality, whereas the former perspective factors them
in. If there are no net (e.g., administrative or incentive) costs in achiev-
ing ex post equality and if the value of opportunity sets is based on even
slight risk aversion, then the two approaches agree that ex post equality
of brute luck is required. If, however, there are costs to such equality,
then the ex ante perspective factors them in and may not require ex
post equality (e.g., when all can face a 90 percent chance of 100 and a
10 percent chance of zero or get 10 for sure). The ex post perspective,
on the other hand, ignores these costs (and requires 10 for sure in the
case just mentioned). The ex ante perspective is, I claim, more plausible.
For it is the perspective that rational individuals would adopt if they
were offered a choice (ex ante, of course) on how to deal with their
own brute luck. Rational individuals would insure against some but not
all possible brute outcome luck events. Given administrative costs, and
so on, the insurance premiums for some of these events are just too
expensive.
Of course, many (indeed probably most!) will be unconvinced by
this willingness to leave brute outcome risks uncompensated. Let us
therefore consider some specific objections.
Brian Barry asks us to consider a case in which there are systematically
massive differences in life chances—a caste system say.22 This strikes us as
22. Brian Barry, “Equal Opportunity and Moral Arbitrariness,” in Equal Opportunity,
ed. Norman E. Bowie (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1988), pp. 23–44. The point also appears
in Brian Barry, Theories of Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p. 224n.
The idea of a lottery for unequal family positions is also discussed in James Fishkin, Justice,
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quite unjust. Our view would, he suggests, be unaffected if we were to
discover that at birth (conception, sentience, or adulthood) individuals
are assigned to castes based on some equal opportunity randomization
device. According to initial opportunity egalitarianism, however, this
makes, it seems, all the difference in the world. Each person would have
initial equality of opportunities for advantage in this case. Each person’s
caste is the result of brute outcome luck, and hence justice may not require
compensation for this. Admittedly, Barry has commonsense intuition on
his side.
To keep things simple, let us assume that the caste systems involved
give all individuals the same rights of noninterference (e.g., of bodily
integrity). For I fully agree that any caste system that does not respect
certain rights of noninterference is unjust. Here, however, we are fo-
cusing on the demands of material equality, and so I want to set this
issue aside. Let us suppose that the caste system gives everyone the same
rights of noninterference but gives positive rights and opportunities
that vary (and vary in value) by caste.
Should mere equality of opportunity be rejected as too weak given
that it can judge caste systems as just? A first reply is that caste systems
are typically inefficient as ways of promoting equality of initial oppor-
tunities for advantage (due to waste of human talent, resentment, etc.).
Hence, caste systems will typically be judged unjust by the equality of
opportunity view as well. Moreover, to the extent that the evaluation of
opportunity sets reflects risk aversion, even if caste systems are efficient
with respect to resources, they may not be efficient with respect to the
value of opportunity sets (e.g., a 50 percent chance of 100 and a 50
percent chance of zero may be judged as less valuable than a 100 percent
chance of 40). Indeed, given that I have remained neutral on the extent
to which the evaluation of opportunity sets reflects risk aversion, nothing
I have said rules out extreme risk aversion in the form of maximin. (In
this case, initial opportunity egalitarianism and brute luck egalitarianism
are effectively equivalent.) If opportunity sets are so evaluated, then
caste systems will be ruled out except where they make the worst-off
person as well-off as possible. Given, however, that extreme risk aversion
is not a plausible way of evaluating opportunity sets, this reply has only
limited force.
Of course, egalitarians concerned with equality of social status will
be totally baffled by the above willingness to envisage the justness of
caste systems.23 For equality of social status is, indeed, totally lacking in
the envisaged situation. Because I am here remaining neutral on the
Equal Opportunity, and the Family (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983), pp.
57–58, 61–64, and 110–13.
23. See Miller; Anderson; Wolff; and Mason.
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relevant conception of outcome advantage, I will not rehearse the in-
adequacies of taking social status to the relevant conception (roughly:
it fails to take account of all the other things that matter to individuals).24
Instead, I will simply note that brute luck egalitarianism faces a com-
parable problem if it holds that option luck advantage need not be
equalized. Unequal option luck can produce inequalities in social status
just as much as unequal brute outcome luck can. Indeed, caste systems
could arise merely as a matter of option luck. Of course, the inequalities
of social status are more likely to arise on initial opportunity egalitari-
anism, but the point here is that equality of social status is a purely
outcome-based concern and hence not one that will provide a wedge
between brute luck and initial opportunity egalitarianism.
A second objection to initial opportunity egalitarianism (raised by
one of the editors of this journal) is the following. Suppose that one
group of people initially faces a 99 percent chance of a wonderful life
and a 1 percent chance of a miserable life, whereas a second group of
people faces the opposite risk (a 1 percent chance of a wonderful life
and a 99 percent chance of a miserable life). According to initial op-
portunity egalitarianism, all the individuals of the first group—including
those whose lives turn out miserably (!)—owe compensation to all the
individuals of the second group—including those whose lives turn out
wonderfully. This, however, seems crazy. Why would a person with a mis-
erable life owe compensation to someone with a wonderful life?
Admittedly, there is something troubling about this, but it is not as
significant as it might seem. First, even brute luck egalitarians agree
that sometimes someone with a miserable life owes compensation to
someone with a wonderful life. For if someone has wonderful brute
luck and then loses everything because of bad option luck, then he
owes—according to brute luck egalitarianism—compensation to a per-
son with terrible brute luck but who has a wonderful life because of
wonderful option luck. We must therefore abstract from claims of need
here. Neither initial opportunity egalitarianism nor brute luck egalitar-
ianism recognizes them. Because my goal here is only to defend the
relative superiority of the former, I shall not here attempt to defend it
against the criticism of insensitivity to needs.
There is, furthermore, a second reply to this objection. Initial op-
portunity egalitarianism will typically provide some compensation for
brute outcome luck (e.g., where there is significant risk aversion and
administrative costs and adverse incentive effects are not too great).
Thus, typically, it may not require any compensation from those with
better prospects who were unlucky and have miserable lives. It may
24. For elaboration on this point, see, e.g., Arneson, “Luck Egalitarianism and
Prioritarianism.”
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instead require those with better prospects who were lucky and have
wonderful lives to cover the entire cost of compensating those with worse
prospects. Of course, there are possible situations in which initial op-
portunity egalitarianism will require those with good prospects but mis-
erable lives to compensate those with bad prospects but adequate lives.
Such situations, however, will be ones in which risk aversion and de-
creasing marginal advantage from resources are not significant enough
to offset the administrative and (if any) incentive costs. In such situa-
tions, it is not so implausible to view this as just (assuming that issues
of needs are set aside).
A related objection to the equality of initial opportunity for advan-
tage is that it seems quite arbitrary to treat initial brute luck as calling
for equalization but not to view brute luck a few seconds later as so
calling. Why should disease that starts prior to the initial point (initial
brute luck) call for equalization but not disease that strikes shortly after
this point (brute outcome luck)?
A first reply is that initial opportunity egalitarianism does not draw
the line as starkly as suggested. As already noted, it may well compensate
for brute outcome luck when this is an efficient way of promoting equal-
ity of initial opportunities. Furthermore, it does not draw the line be-
tween what happens before the initial point and what happens after.
Rather, it assesses the chances for advantage relative to that initial point.
If at that point there is a 100 percent chance that a bad brute luck event
will happen some twenty years later, the evaluation of the opportunity
set will fully reflect the occurrence of that event. Thus, if one individual
faces such an event and an otherwise identically situated agent does
not, then initial opportunity egalitarianism requires that full compen-
sation be given to the first individual. Furthermore, if the chance of the
bad brute luck event is 99 percent, then it will require in principle
almost full compensation.
Initial opportunity egalitarianism does not attach any principled
significance to whether events occur before or after the initial evaluation
point. It is, rather, that it evaluates the opportunity set relative to the
chances involved at that point. The issue that separates brute luck and
initial opportunity concerns compensation for how these chances turn
out. Indeed, where the initial chance of an event is 100 percent (i.e.,
where it is fully deterministic), then both views agree that full compen-
sation is owed. In this case, there is no relevant brute outcome luck.
The event is simply a case of bad brute luck in initial opportunities.
A related objection to equality of initial opportunities is that it
arbitrarily fails to provide for equalization for events that were com-
pletely unforeseeable at the beginning of the initial opportunity set. If,
for example, equalization is provided between two children at the be-
ginning of their lives, and it is later discovered that one of the children
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had a previously undetected genetic predisposition to a certain disease,
it seems quite unjust not to provide compensation simply because we
were initially unable to detect this disposition.
The answer, of course, is that it would indeed be completely unjust
to provide no later compensation in such a case. For as a matter of fact
the initial opportunities were not equal. We believed that they were
equal, but they were not. Hence, the discovery of the genetic disposition
requires some additional compensation for the person in question.
This ends my defense of equality of initial opportunity for advantage
and my criticism of equality of brute luck advantage. I now turn to a
second issue that may seem to separate the two views: the treatment of
option luck. Brute luck egalitarians have tended to condemn compen-
sation for bad option luck. I shall argue, however, that egalitari-
ans—including brute luck egalitarians—need not, and should not, al-
ways condemn such compensation.
JUSTICE PERMITS COMPENSATION FOR OPTION LUCK
DISADVANTAGE
So far, we have focused on principles of equality (what should be equal-
ized). A theory of justice may also posit principles of accountability (what
should not be equalized). One way of equalizing brute luck advantage,
for example, is by implementing a publicly announced and suitably
proactive policy of equalizing outcome advantage. Most brute luck egal-
itarians, however, would reject this approach on the grounds that it
equalizes the results of option luck, and these should not be equalized.
They invoke a principle of accountability to rule out equality of outcome
advantage. I shall argue against substantive principles of accountability.
Neither brute luck egalitarianism nor equal initial opportunity egali-
tarianism need, nor should, endorse such principles. For simplicity, I
will focus on brute luck egalitarianism, but the issue applies to all forms
of egalitarianism.
Suppose that each agent starts with equally valuable opportunities
for advantage, there is no brute outcome luck, and some individuals
run cash lotteries (selling tickets and giving out cash prizes). These
lotteries are reasonably avoidable and their possible results are fully
foreseeable. Hence, any resulting inequalities are the results of option
luck. Does justice permit the coercive imposition of a tax on lottery
winnings to help those who are destitute because of losing all their
money on lotteries? Below I shall address the question of whether justice
would allow such taxation when the taxation scheme is introduced ret-
roactively. First, however, I want to consider the public and proactive
introduction of the scheme. That is, we shall consider the justice of
such a taxation scheme where this scheme is publicly announced and
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only applies to lottery winnings that take place after the public
announcement.
Brute luck egalitarians have some tendency to hold that such a
scheme is unjust. After all, without the scheme, the resulting inequalities
would be the result of option luck. The idea is that, although coercive
redistribution is called for to equalize brute luck advantage, it should
not modify the “natural” option luck differential payoff structure. In-
stead, if there is full information, the redistribution scheme should
simply tax each person an amount equal to his or her excess brute luck
advantage and transfer to people an amount equal to their brute luck
advantage shortfall. The basic option luck payoff structure should not
be modified. Taxes should not be choice sensitive (e.g., you should not
have to pay higher taxes if you chose to play the lottery and win).
Brute luck egalitarians, that is, have tended to endorse something
like the following principle of accountability:
Natural Rewards: If, prior to any coercive transfers, two agents are
identical with respect to the factors for which justice requires equal-
ization, then justice requires that the two agents have the same
coercive transfers (e.g., taxes or subsidies).25
This is a generic principle; it leaves open what factors must be
equalized. It says that whatever they are (e.g., brute luck advantage or
initial opportunities for advantage), there should be no transfers beyond
those required for the relevant equality. If, prior to the transfers, two
agents are already equal in the relevant respects, then their transfers
should be the same. Their net transfers (taxes or subsidies) should not
depend on what choices they make. For brute luck egalitarians, this
means that there should be no equalization that is not required for
brute luck equalization.
This principle, however, is implausible. There is no reason to treat
the pre-coercive-redistribution—or “natural”—payoff structure as priv-
ileged. Typically, there will be many redistributive schemes that will
25. Dworkin’s condition of ambition-sensitivity for the justness of resource alloca-
tions—which requires that gains and losses from choices not be redistributed when made
from an appropriate position of equality—is a version of Natural Rewards. See “What Is
Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources,” p. 311. In the economics literature, something
like Natural Rewards is known as Equal Resources for Equal Nonresponsible Characteristics
(or some variant thereof), and talents and handicaps are typically assumed to be the
nonresponsible characteristics. A weaker natural rewards principle requires only that there
be no transfers when everyone has the same (or equally valuable) nonresponsible char-
acteristics. My argument in the text applies against this weaker principle as well. For
formulation and discussion of natural reward conditions, see, e.g., Fleurbaey, “Equal Op-
portunity for Equal Social Outcome,” and “Equality among Responsible Individuals,” in
Freedom in Economics: New Perspectives in Normative Analysis, ed. Jean-Franc¸ois Laslier, Marc
Fleurbaey, Nicolas Gravel, and Alain Trannoy (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 206–34.
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maximally equalize brute luck advantage. Leaving the natural (pretrans-
fer) option luck differential payoff structure in place (and taxing away
excess brute luck advantage) will be one of them, but it may not be the
most efficient way of maximally promoting brute luck equality. A mod-
ification of the natural option luck payoff structure may, in conjunction
with taxes on brute luck advantage, also maximally equalize brute ad-
vantage, and it may produce higher levels of brute luck advantage for
everyone. This will be the case, for example, where risk aversion leads
to an underproduction of goods. Let me explain.
Suppose that all agents start with equally valuable opportunities
(initial brute luck) and that (for simplicity) there is no brute outcome
luck. There is no need for coercive transfers for the purposes of achiev-
ing brute luck equality. Suppose that there are just two ways of providing
health care services. One way is to have no coercive transfers for that
purpose and to let individuals purchase individual insurance on the free
market. This is the scheme favored by Natural Rewards (relative to brute
luck egalitarianism as well as relative to initial opportunity egalitarian-
ism), since it leaves “natural” option luck in place. The only alternative,
let us suppose, is to coercively tax everyone an equal amount to fund
the health services and then to provide all basic health services inde-
pendently of whether the health problems are the result of brute luck
(e.g., lung problems even if brought on solely because of smoking or
liver problems induced solely by excessive drinking). This violates Nat-
ural Rewards, since the net transfers (taxes plus benefits) are not needed
to achieve the requisite equality (which by stipulation was already pre-
sent). Although the (equal per capita) taxes are choice insensitive, the
funded benefits are not. Those who develop lung problems because
they choose to smoke will, all else being equal, gain greater net funded
benefits than those with the same brute luck (e.g., genetic disposition
for lung cancer) who choose not to smoke.
There is, however, no principled reason to hold that coercive fund-
ing of universal health services is unjust. Both it and the market ap-
proach will equalize brute luck and be suitably proactive and publicly
announced. If the administrative costs and adverse incentives of the
coercively funded scheme are sufficiently high, then the market ap-
proach will be a more efficient way of equalizing brute luck advantage.
If, however, the administrative costs of the coercively funded scheme
are sufficiently low (or even just sufficiently lower than the market ap-
proach!), the incentive effects are not significantly adverse (or perhaps
even positive), and people are sufficiently risk averse, then the coercively
funded scheme may be more efficient. It may be, that is, that the co-
ercively funded scheme will provide just as much equality, but with
individuals at a higher level of brute luck advantage. If it is, then justice,
I claim, requires the coercively funded scheme—even though some peo-
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ple will not be fully bearing the costs of their “natural” option luck
health decisions. It would be unjust, because inefficient, to insist—as
Natural Rewards does—that there be no choice-sensitive transfers. Ret-
roactive choice-sensitive transfers are indeed problematic, but public
and proactive ones are not (since agents will take these transfers into
account in their choices).
A more abstract example may help clarify the point. Here I will
focus just on risk aversion and incentives and indicate how schemes that
reduce the opportunity for option luck may be more efficient ways of
equalizing brute luck advantage (or alternatively: the value of initial
opportunities). I’ll assume for simplicity that administrative costs are
zero, and that the advantage equalisandum (e.g., well-being) is also what
individuals rationally seek to promote. Suppose that water is in scarce
supply and that each individual has a choice between exploring for
water and not exploring. Exploration provides a 20 percent chance of
failure and hence of receiving nothing and an 80 percent chance of
success (finding water) and hence of receiving 10 units. Exploration
thus has an expected value, for each individual, of 8 units. Nonexplor-
ation ensures, say, that one will receive 7 units of advantage for sure.
Assume, as is reasonable, that the difference in outcomes is a matter of
option luck. Because people are significantly risk averse, if this natural
option luck is left in place, no one, let us suppose, would choose the
risky option and everyone would end up with 7 units. Under a second
scheme, however, full compensation is provided for those who choose
the risky option and lose. Instead of getting nothing, they receive 8 units
from a tax transfer scheme that is funded from the profits of those who
choose the risky option and win. Under this scheme, the “risky” option
ceases to be risky, since one will get 8 units for sure after transfers.
Furthermore, this option is clearly preferable to the first option of 7
units for sure. Hence, everyone would choose the “risky” option. The
result will thus be that 20 percent of the agents will lose and get nothing
initially, and 80 percent of them will win and get 10 units initially. Then,
as announced in advance, each of the winners is subject to a tax to
provide 8 units to each of the losers. Each winner pays a tax of 2 (p
and thus ends up with 8 units. Both schemes equalize brute[8# .2]/.8)
luck advantage (since each ensures that the initial opportunities are the
same for all and that there is no brute outcome luck) and are proactively
public. Under the second scheme, however, each person’s brute luck
advantage is higher than it is under the first.
Natural Rewards holds that agents have a preinstitutional entitle-
ment to reap their “natural rewards,” where these are understood as
the rewards that would follow if no coercive redistribution were imple-
mented between agents who are identical with respect to the factors
that must be equalized (e.g., brute luck or initial opportunities). Brute
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luck egalitarians have been attracted to Natural Rewards, I think, be-
cause they view it as unjust for someone to be coercively required to
subsidize someone else’s option luck (e.g., the health cost of smoking,
when this is genuine option luck).26 This point, however, does not sup-
port Natural Rewards. People should indeed reap the benefits and bear
burdens in accordance with the payoffs as defined by public and proac-
tive just institutions. There is, however, no reason to suppose that just
institutions must leave “natural” rewards in place. The natural reward
structure is just one among many possibilities.
One might think that respecting the natural reward structure is
required if the reward scheme is to be neutral among competing con-
ceptions of the good life. Altering the “natural” reward structure, it may
be thought, would favor some conceptions over others.27 This, however,
is not so. We are assuming throughout that the reward scheme must
satisfy brute luck (or initial opportunity) egalitarianism. As long as the
relevant conception of advantage is suitably neutral (e.g., some kind of
preference satisfaction theory), there will be the relevant equality and
neutrality. All will face equal brute luck advantage.
Natural Rewards is implausible because it views the “natural” option
luck payoff structure as if it were normatively privileged, but it is not.
Furthermore, by doing so, it is incompatible with our duty to others to
provide them as much of the relevant equalisandum as possible (given
what others are receiving). It rules out schemes that may be just as
equalizing and better for everyone than schemes that it allows.28 Thus,
26. For example, in Contemporary Political Philosophy (New York: Oxford, 1990), Will
Kymlicka writes: “This points to an important component of our everyday sense of what
it means to treat people as equals—namely, we should not expect others to subsidize our
projects at the expense of their own” (p. 40). “Treating people with equal concern requires
that people pay the cost of their own choices. . . . It is equally unjust for me to demand
that someone else pay for the costs of my choices” (p. 75). For related discussions of this
issue, see Terry Price, “Egalitarian Justice, Luck, and the Costs of Chosen Ends,” American
Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1999): 267–78; Mason; and Colin MacLeod, Liberalism, Justice,
and Markets (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
27. See, e.g., pp. 210–11 of Fleurbaey, “Equality among Responsible Individuals,” and
pp. 685–86 of “Equality and Responsibility,” European Economic Review 39 (1995): 683–89.
28. Marc Fleurbaey has noted the incompatibility of Natural Rewards with Pareto
efficiency in contexts in which individuals are accountable for their preferences. My crit-
icism appeals to incentive effects and risk aversion and does not depend on holding people
accountable for their preferences (which is implausible when this is a matter of brute
luck). See p. 212 of Fleurbaey, “Equality among Responsible Individuals,” and pp. 34–36
of “Equal Opportunity Egalitarianism or Equal Social Outcome,” Economics and Philosophy
11 (1995): 25–55.
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brute luck egalitarians and initial opportunity egalitarians can and
should reject Natural Rewards.29
There is, however, a related principle that is plausible. Natural Re-
wards places a general constraint on the structure of payoffs. It opposes
“unnecessary” transfers (i.e., transfers that are not necessary for equal-
izing the relevant factors) even when this is public and proactive. The
related and more plausible principle has no problem with suitably public
and proactive modifications of “natural” payoffs. It rejects, however,
coercive redistributions that are not suitably public and proactive. Rawls
is appealing to something like this principle when he writes, “It is per-
fectly true that given a just system of cooperation as a scheme of public
rules and the expectations set up by it, those who, with the prospect of
improving their condition, have done what the system announces that
it will reward are entitled to their advantages. . . . But this sense of
desert presupposes the existence of the cooperative scheme; it is irrel-
evant to the question of whether in the first place the scheme is to be
designed in accordance with the difference principle or some other
criterion.”30
Consider, then:
Institutional Rewards: If, prior to any coercive transfers, two agents
are identical with respect to the factors for which justice requires
equalization, then justice requires that they have transfers that have
the same excess/shortfall relative to the transfers dictated by the
public institutional norms governing transfers that were in effect
shortly before their choices.31
Very crudely, the basic idea of this principle is that transfers should
be done in accordance with institutional norms that are public (e.g., of
29. Frank Vandenbroucke has, I have discovered from Marc Fleurbaey, independently
made a similar criticism of Natural Rewards in chap. 1 of his Social Justice and Individual
Ethics in an Open Society: Equality, Responsibility, and Incentives (Berlin: Springer, 2001).
30. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971),
p. 103. For additional discussion of legitimate institutional expectations see pp. 310–15
and pp. 188–89 of T. M. Scanlon, “The Significance of Choice,” in The Tanner Lectures on
Human Values, ed. Sterling McMurrin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), vol.
8, pp. 151–216. For an argument that a noninstitutional conception of rewards/desert is
needed, see Samuel Scheffler, “Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and Liberalism in Phi-
losophy and Practice,” Philosophy& Public Affairs 21 (1992): 299–323. For related discussion,
see Owen McLeod, “Desert and Institutions,” in What Do We Deserve? A Reader on Justice
and Desert, ed. Louis P. Pojman and Owen McLeod (New York: Oxford University Press,
1999), pp. 186–95.
31. For simplicity, I leave out one important qualification. The principle is to be
understood as allowing deviations from legitimate expectations where this is the morally
appropriate response to a past wrong. Legitimate expectations need not be respected
where an independent wrong is involved. A similar qualification is needed for Natural
Rewards.
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which most people are aware) and in effect at the time of choice. The
principle does not, however, require strict adherence to the public
norms in place at the time of choice. For to do so would in general
rule out the possibility of equalizing the relevant factors (e.g., brute
luck)—since typically the public institutional norms in place do not
ensure the requisite equality. The principle therefore requires some-
thing weaker than strict adherence to the public norms in place. It
allows transfers to diverge from the requirements of the public norms
but only as long as the divergence is the same—no matter what choices
they have made—for agents that are identical with respect to the factors
that must be equalized. Thus, although agents will not in general get
what the public norms in place at the time of their choices required
(since some adjustment will be necessary so as to equalize appropri-
ately), the discrepancy will not depend on what choices they made.
Obviously, there are several murky issues lurking here. What exactly
is required for a norm to be suitably public? How much advance notice
is needed for proactivity? Some of these issues, no doubt, could be
cleaned up by a more thorough analysis. There will also surely be some
inevitable vagueness in these notions. The basic idea, I hope, should
be clear enough.
Something like Institutional Rewards is plausible for egalitarians.
Of course, those who endorse independent principles of preinstitutional
desert or entitlement will have reason to reject this principle and impose
their preferred principle of accountability.32 My point here is that there
is no need for egalitarians to endorse such preinstitutional principles
of accountability. They can endorse a robust principle of accountability
simply by endorsing Institutional Rewards.
Once it is recognized that Natural Rewards—in addition to privi-
leging the pretransfer distribution—has absolutely no sensitivity to the
prevailing institutional norms governing transfers (and the expectations
that they generate), its implausibility is obvious. As a retroactive prin-
ciple, Natural Rewards’ insensitivity to legitimate institutional expecta-
tions is fatal. As a proactive principle, it has no problem in that regard,
but its arbitrariness is now obvious. Equality should be promoted in ways
that ensure individuals reap the differential benefits and bear the dif-
ferential burdens of their choices in accordance with the institutional
norms publicly in place at the time of their choices, but robust ac-
countability does not require that individuals get their “natural” rewards.
32. A defender of strong preinstitutional desert is George Sher, Desert (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987). John Roemer and Richard Arneson each advocate
theories of justice in which preinstitutional desert plays a role. See Roemer, “A Pragmatic
Theory of Responsibility for the Egalitarian Planner” and Equality of Opportunity; and Ar-
neson, “Equality” and “Equality of Opportunity for Welfare Defended and Recanted.”
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Before closing, we should note that once Natural Rewards is re-
jected, brute luck (and initial opportunity) egalitarianism is less prone
to two objections based on its alleged treatment of option luck. First,
it has been argued that brute luck egalitarianism can be unduly harsh
in its noncompensation of extremely bad option luck.33 We can now see
that this does not follow as immediately as claimed—at least where public
norms for the future are at issue. It may take a harsh line and provide
no compensation for bad “natural” option luck. It will do this, however,
only where brute luck equality is more efficiently promoted (e.g., due
to administrative costs and adverse incentive effects). In many cases (e.g.,
where there are favorable incentive effects and people are extremely
risk averse), it will provide some partial (or perhaps full) compensation
for bad “natural” option luck. Of course, this does not eliminate the
objection, since efficiency may well dictate taking a harsh line. It does,
however, soften the objection, since in such cases the harsh line will
have a plausible rationale.
It has also been objected that invoking the distinction between
brute and option luck can be highly intrusive and demeaning.34 It re-
quires highly specific information about individuals and classifies some
as inferior in the sense of having a lower capacity for a good life. This
may well be so, but brute luck egalitarianism can be sensitive to these
costs. To the extent they are present, there is a reason not to base the
institutional norms on the distinction between natural brute and option
luck. If these costs (effects on people’s outcome advantage) are great,
it may favor providing compensation based on need or simply universal
provision. Once the commitment to not equalizing factors that need
not be equalized is dropped, it’s an open question what kind of option
luck compensation scheme brute luck egalitarianism will favor. Again,
this does not eliminate the objection, but it does soften it.
In summary, egalitarians generally (including initial opportunity
egalitarians), and brute luck egalitarians in particular, should reject
Natural Rewards and instead base their principles of accountability on
Institutional Rewards.
CONCLUSION
The distinction between brute and option luck is not, I have argued,
as clear as is generally supposed. The core notion for brute luck is that
of unavoidability, but this needs to be generalized to the absence of
(strict or reasonable) deliberate influenceability. The crucial outstand-
ing problems for brute luck egalitarianism are (1) identifying some
33. For example, Fleurbaey, “Equal Opportunity for Equal Social Outcome”; and
Anderson.
34. Wolff; Anderson.
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relevant manner of apportioning degrees of influenceability so that the
presence of a trivial amount of deliberate influenceability does not con-
vert everything to option luck and (2) identifying how brute luck egal-
itarianism is to be understood once the distinction between brute and
option luck is understood as a matter of degree.
I have further argued that justice does not, in any case, require
that brute luck advantage be equalized, nor that natural option luck
advantage be left in place. Justice requires that initial opportunities for
advantage be equalized, but this need not (although it may) compensate
for inequalities in brute outcome luck, and it may favor compensating
for inequalities in natural option luck. The extent to which such com-
pensation should be provided is a contingent matter and is determined
by how efficiently it promotes equality of initial opportunities for ad-
vantage. We owe this efficiency to others.
